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Abstract  
 The European Convention on Human Rights does not contain any 
explicit reference to the right to asylum. However, the European Court of 
Human Rights has provided protection of asylum seekers mainly through 
interpretation of Article 3 of the Convention. Moreover, even if there is no 
specific mention of non-refoulement in this Article, the Court has interpreted 
it to include the prohibition of refoulement. Today, the ECHR is one of the 
most important juridical instruments for protection of asylum seekers 
throughout Europe. The main reason for this is that the principle of non-
refoulement under the Convention extends to inhuman and degrading 
behavior. This paper has placed its focus on the applicability of the ECHR to 
asylum cases, particularly the development and treatment of the principle of 
non-refoulement, as a form of complementary protection to those seeking 
asylum. This will be elaborated mainly through analysis of the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR. It will be shown that the principle of non-refoulement under 
the ECHR, as a barrier to removal, plays a significant complementary role 
regarding the protection of asylum seekers. It will also be shown that the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR has important relevance to EU asylum law and 
policy. In this sense, a comparison between EU law and ECHR protection 
standards for asylum seekers will be elaborated as well. Finally, it will be 
concluded that EU Member States are faced with dual systems providing 
protection to asylum seekers, and a possible solution will be suggested in 
order to overcome this situation. 
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Introduction 
 The right of states to admit or exclude aliens of their territory is one 
of the main features of the concept of national sovereignty. States are bound 
to admit aliens only in cases where exclusion from the territory or from 
protection would constitute a breach of certain international law provision. 
The most significant example of the latter principle is the right to asylum 
(Mole and Meredith, 2010: 10).  
 There are several main legal regimes for the international protection 
of asylum seekers and refugees in Europe: the 1951 United Nations 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) and 
its 1967 Protocol; the law of the European Union (“EU law”); the 1984 
United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“UNCAT”) and the 1950 Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, or better 
known as the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and its 
Protocols. These legal regimes exist simultaneously and they often overlap 
(Mole and Meredith, 2010: 7). Nonetheless, it could be claimed that the 
Refugee Convention, together with its 1967 Protocol, is “the starting point 
for considering asylum in Europe” (European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014: 64) 
 However, it should be noted that the percentage of individuals whose 
situation falls outside the ambit of the Refugee Convention, the UNCAT and 
the EU law is rather high (Maas, 2009: 5; Mole and Meredith, 2010: 8). On 
the other hand, these individuals are granted protection under the ECHR 
(Mole and Meredith, 2010: 8), despite the fact that the ECHR does not 
contain any explicit reference to the right to asylum, or any specific mention 
of non-refoulement  (Bacian, 2011: 40; 53-54). 
 Namely, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR) has 
provided protection of asylum seekers mainly through interpretation of 
Article 3 of the ECHR. Moreover, even if there is no specific mention of 
non-refoulement in this Article, ECtHR  has interpreted Article 3 to include 
the prohibition of refoulement (Bacian, 2011: 40, 53-54), 
 This paper has placed its focus on the applicability of the ECHR to 
asylum cases, particularly the development and treatment of the principle of 
non-refoulement, as a form of complementary protection to those seeking 
asylum. This will be elaborated mainly through analysis of the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR. It will be shown that the principle of non-refoulement under 
the ECHR, as a barrier to removal, plays a significant complementary role 
regarding the protection of asylum seekers. It will also be shown that the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR has important relevance to the EU asylum law 
and policy. In this sense, a comparison between EU law and ECHR 
protection standards for asylum seekers will be elaborated as well. Finally, it 
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will be concluded that EU Member States are faced with dual systems 
providing protection to asylum seekers, and a possible solution will be 
suggested in order to overcome this situation. 
 
International Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Europe 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), which is 
“considered to be the single most authoritative source of human rights 
norms” (Chapman, 1999: 133), provides protection of the right to “seek and 
enjoy asylum from persecution” within its Article 14. However, this right is 
not foreseen within the other general instruments for international human 
rights protection, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”) or the ECHR. In large part, the latter is due to the fact that 
at the time when these human rights instruments were drafted, it was 
considered that the Refugee Convention would have the capacity to fully 
cover the need for protection of the right to asylum (Mole and Meredith, 
2010: 10). 
 Indeed, in the early years of the Refugee Convention, there were no 
problems regarding the recognition as a refugee in Europe. However, this is 
not the case anymore. Namely, in the last couple of decades, European states 
have been demonstrating a relatively high level of reluctance to recognizing 
people in need of protection as refugees. Moreover, it could be noted that the 
role of the Refugee Convention “is now in many respects performed in the 
European context by general human rights instruments and, in particular, by 
the ECHR” (Mole and Meredith, 2010: 10-11). 
 The definition of a refugee, foreseen in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee 
Convention, according to which a refugee is someone who “owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such a fear, unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside of the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it …”, is now well recognized in international law, as well as the 
principle of non-refoulement, established in Article 33(1) of the Refugee 
Convention, which states the following: “No Contracting State shall expel or 
return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion” (United Nations Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 1951). However, it should be noted that the Refugee Convention 
was designed to “provide a legal status for those persons who found 
themselves outside their country of nationality or habitual residence and in 
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fear of persecution as a consequence of events occurring in Europe before 1 
January 1951’” (Mole and Meredith, 2010: 11). 
 On the other hand, although the main reason behind the creation of 
the ECHR was “to provide legal regional recognition of most of the rights set 
out in the UDHR and to provide international mechanisms to police their 
implementation, there is no provision that reflects Article 14 of the UDHR 
(Mole and Meredith, 2010: 11). Namely, the ECHR does not contain any 
explicit reference to the right to asylum, nor it contains specific mention of 
the principle of refoulement (Bacian, 2011: 53). 
 Although the Refugee Convention is still effective and very 
important, many individuals who are in need of international protection due 
to being “at risk of expulsion to situations where they would face serious 
harm such as torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, or 
whose expulsion would in itself constitute such treatment”, fall outside its 
scope. The main reason for this is the lack of possibility to establish a link 
between the persecution feared and one of the five grounds that the Refugee 
Convention foresees (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion) (Mole and Meredith, 2010: 11). In fact, 
according to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the individuals 
who fall within one of the categories of the Refugee Convention are “the 
exception rather than the rule” (Röhl, 2005: 1). 
 However, bearing in mind that the Refugee Convention is “the lex 
specialis of asylum” and “the key international instrument for protecting 
those who fall within its scope” (Mole and Meredith, 2010: 9), it is now 
largely incorporated into EU law through the Directive 2011/95/EU on 
Standards for the Qualifications of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless 
Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a Uniform Status of 
Refugees or for Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the 
Content of the Protection Granted (“Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU”) 
(European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 
2014: 64). The Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU repeals the Directive 
2004/83/EC on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third 
Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who 
Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection 
Granted (“Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC”) (European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014: 64; Bacaian, 2011: 
48), as one of instruments that led to the formation of Common European 
Asylum System (“CEAS”), which aims to “harmonize and streamline legal 
standards relating to asylum in the Member States of the EU” (Maas, 2009: 
3).  
 Yet, the most relevant provision regarding the protection against 
removal, Article 15 read in conjunction with Article 2, remains in its content 
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the same in the recast Qualitative Directive 2011/95/EU. Namely, Article 15 
foresees the conditions for qualification for subsidiary protection, which is 
applicable only to an individual “who does not qualify as a refugee”. (Maas, 
2009: 19; Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU). 
 
Applicability of the ECHR to Asylum Cases 
 Although the ECHR does not contain a provision that explicitly refers 
to the right to asylum, the ECtHR has provided protection of asylum seekers 
mainly through the various interpretations of Article 3 of the ECHR (Bacian, 
2011: 53-54), which prohibits torture and “inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment” (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 1950). In fact, there is a substantial body of 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, which “sets the standards for the rights of 
asylum seekers all across Europe” (Mole and Meredith, 2010: 11). 
 The ECtHR has stated in several occasions that the right to asylum, 
as such, does not exist in the ECHR or its Protocols (Vilvarajah and Others 
v. the United Kingdom; Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands) (Mole and 
Meredith, 2010: 11). In this sense, in the case of Lilia, Julia and Eleonora 
Alimzhanova and Alexjs Lisikov v. Sweden, the ECtHR found that “the 
Convention does not guarantee a right to asylum or refugee status, but only 
prohibits the expulsion of persons to a country where they may be subjected 
to treatment contrary to Article 3”.  
 The issue of applicability of the ECHR to asylum cases was 
considered in detail for the first time in the case of Soering v. the United 
Kingdom (1989). This case did not concern a political asylum, but 
extradition (Maas, 2009: 17; Mole and Meredith, 2010: 11). The applicant 
was a German national, who was detained in prison in England pending 
extradition to the United States of America to face charges of murder in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia (Soering v. the United Kingdom, ¶11). At that 
time, the average time between trial and execution in Virginia was six to 
eight years. The delays were known as the "death row phenomenon" 
(Soering v. the United Kingdom, ¶56). The applicant alleged that the decision 
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department to surrender him to the 
authorities of the United States of America would, if implemented, give rise 
to a breach by the United Kingdom of Article 3 of the ECHR (Soering v. the 
United Kingdom, ¶80). The ECtHR noted that the alleged breach derives 
from the applicant’s exposure to the so-called "death row phenomenon", 
while it described this phenomenon as “consisting in a combination of 
circumstances to which the applicant would be exposed if, after having been 
extradited to Virginia to face a capital murder charge, he were sentenced to 
death” (Soering v. the United Kingdom, ¶81). 
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 The ECtHR also confirmed the existence of other international 
instruments, which explicitly regulate the issue of sending individuals in a 
country where they will face a risk to be exposed at prohibited treatment. In 
this sense, the ECtHR specifically mentioned the Refugee Convention, the 
1957 European Convention on Extradition and the UNCAT (Soering v. the 
United Kingdom, ¶86). However, it found that the existence of these 
international instruments could not “absolve the Contracting Parties from 
responsibility under Article 3 for all and any foreseeable consequences of 
extradition suffered outside their jurisdiction” (Soering v. the United 
Kingdom, ¶86). 
 Furthermore, the ECtHR noted that “the fact that a specialised treaty 
should spell out in detail a specific obligation attaching to the prohibition of 
torture does not mean that an essentially similar obligation is not already 
inherent in the general terms of Article 3 of the ECHR”. According to the 
Court, “it would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the 
Convention, that ‘common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom 
and the rule of law’ to which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State 
knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State where there were 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed”. For 
this reason, the ECtHR concluded that “extradition in such circumstances, 
while not explicitly referred to in the brief and general wording of Article 3, 
would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article, and in 
the Court’s view this inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to 
cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the receiving State by a real 
risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
proscribed by that Article” (Soering v. the United Kingdom, ¶88). 
 As a result of the assessment of the applicability of Article 3 in cases 
of extradition, the ECtHR has summed up that ” … [T]he decision by a 
Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue under 
Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the 
Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that 
the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting 
country. The establishment of such responsibility inevitably involves an 
assessment of conditions in the requesting country against the standards of 
Article 3 … [I]t is liability incurred by the extraditing Contracting State by 
reason of its having taken action which has as a direct consequence the 
exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment” (Soering v. the United 
Kingdom, ¶91). 
 Another important case as regards the applicability of the ECHR to 
asylum cases is the case of Cruz Varas v. Sweden. Namely, this case 
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concerned a refused asylum seeker for the first time (Maas, 2009: 17; Mole 
and Meredith, 2010: 21). In this case, the ECtHR concluded that the 
principle established in the case of Soering v. the United Kingdom can also 
be applied to decisions to expel: “Although the present case concerns 
expulsion as opposed to a decision to extradite, the Court considers that the 
above principle also applies to expulsion decisions and a fortiori to cases of 
actual expulsion” (Cruz Varas v. Sweden, ¶70). This finding of the ECtHR 
was reiterated in the case of Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom 
(Mole and Meredith, 2010: 21). Namely, in this case, the Court has 
reaffirmed that “expulsion by a Contracting State of an asylum seeker may 
give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of 
that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown 
for believing that the person concerned faced a real risk of being subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country to 
which he was returned …” (Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, 
¶103). 
 The ECtHR has most frequently considered asylum cases under 
Article 3. However, it should be mentioned that there are also other 
provisions within the ECHR, which are relevant to asylum issues. Namely, 
asylum cases may also rise issues of return to face risks under Article 2 (right 
to life), Article 4 (prohibition of slavery, servitude and compulsory labor), 
Article 5 (right to liberty and security), Article 6 (right to a fair trial), Article 
7 (prohibition on retroactive criminal punishment), Article 8 (right to respect 
for private and family life), Article 9 (right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion), Article 10 (freedom of expression), Article 11 
(freedom of assembly and association), Article 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination in the enjoyment of ECHR rights), Article 4 of Protocol No.4 
(collective expulsion of aliens), Article 1 of Protocol No.7 (exclusion of own 
nationals), Article 4 of Protocol No.7 (prohibition of double jeopardy) and 
Article 1 of Protocol No.12 (general prohibition on discrimination) (Mole 
and Meredith, 2010: 23). 
 
The Principle of Non-Refoulement under the ECHR 
 When it recognized the applicability of the ECHR to asylum cases 
through interpretation of Article 3, the ECtHR has actually at the same time 
recognized and established the principle of non-refoulement under the 
ECHR. Namely, this principle was discussed for the first time in the case of 
Soering v. the United Kingdom, in the context of the applicability of the 
ECHR to asylum cases (concretely, the applicability to extradition or 
removal) through interpretation of Article 3: ” … [T]he decision by a 
Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue under 
Article 3 … where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that 
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the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting 
country” (Soering v. the United Kingdom, ¶91). In this sense, it could be 
noted that even if there is no specific mention to the principle of non-
refoulement in Article 3, the ECtHR has interpreted this Article to include 
the prohibition of refoulement (Bacian, 2011: 40).  
 The fact that the principle of non-refoulement under the ECHR, 
unlike the Refugee Convention, extends to inhuman and degrading behavior 
(Röhl, 2005: 1), makes the ECHR “one of the most important juridical 
instruments for protection of asylum seekers throughout Europe” (Bacian, 
2011: 54). Namely, the prohibition of refoulement is “a form of 
complementary protection covering a wider category of ‘refugees’ beyond 
the 1951 definiton” (Maas, 2009: 16). According to McAdam, 
complementary protection describes “the role of human rights in broadening 
the categories of persons to whom international protection is owed beyond 
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention” (McAdam in Maas, 2009: 16). 
 The implicit non-refoulement obligation, emanating from Article 3 of 
the ECHR, was the main source of complementary protection of asylum 
seekers in EU Member States until 2004, when the Qualification Directive 
2004/83/EC was adopted (Maas, 2009: 16). The Qualification Directive 
2004/83/EC (later revised with the Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU) 
codifies in large part the jurisprudence on complementary protection under 
Article 3 of the ECHR (Maas, 2009: 19). Before the adoption of the 
Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC, specific international law on 
complementary protection did not exist (Maas, 2009: 16). In the 
Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC, complementary protection is referred to 
as “subsidiary protection” (Maas, 2009: 18). This Directive defines the 
criteria of eligibility for subsidiary protection and codifies the prohibition of 
refoulement (Maas, 2009: 18-19). 
 
Comparison of EU law and ECHR protection standards for asylum 
seekers 
 Regarding the protection standards for asylum seekers under EU law, 
the EU has an obligation to provide a policy for asylum, subsidiary 
protection and temporary protection, which is foreseen in Article 78 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. In this sense, the EU is obliged to 
ensure compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and this policy 
must be in accordance with the ECHR, the Refugee Convention, the 
UNCAT, the ICCPR and other relevant treaties. The EU asylum acquis 
measures, which have been adopted under this policy, include the Dublin 
Regulation (Regulation (EU) No.604/2013, the Qualification Directive 
(2011/95/EU), the Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU) and the 
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Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU) (European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014: 64-65). 
 The Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU) introduces “a set of 
common standards for the qualification of persons as refugees or those in 
need of international protection” into EU law. It includes the rights and 
duties of that protection, where the key element is non-refoulement under 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention (European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014: 65). 
 The Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU provides “subsidiary 
protection” for persons who do not qualify as refugees, but if they are 
returned to their country of origin or former habitual residence, they would 
face a real risk of suffering serious harm defined as” the death penalty or 
execution” (Article 15(1)), “torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment” (Article 15(b)) and “serious and individual threat to a civilian’s 
life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of 
international or internal armed conflict” (Article 15(c)) (Qualification 
Directive 2011/95/EU). 
 The prohibition of refoulement is explicitly codified in Article 21(1) 
of the Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU, according to which “Member 
States shall respect the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with their 
international obligations”. This article reaffirms the obligation of Member 
States to respect the principle of non-refoulement, but it also foresees a few 
exceptions to this rule within its second paragraph (Qualification Directive 
2011/95/EU). Similarly, Article 17 of the Qualification Directive 
2011/95/EU foresees several exceptions under which a third-country national 
or a stateless person could be excluded from being eligible for subsidiary 
protection (Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU). 
 It could be noted that neither Article 33 of the Refugee Convention 
nor Articles 17 and 21 of the Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU contain 
absolute prohibition of refoulement. Namely, these articles “allow for the 
removal of a refugee in very exceptional circumstances”, such as when the 
person has committed a serious crime or when the person constitutes a 
danger to the community or to the security of the Member State in which that 
person is present (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and 
Council of Europe, 2014: 65). 
 As to the protection standards under the ECHR, Article 3 absolutely 
prohibits any return of an individual who would face a real risk of treatment 
contrary to this provision, which is different from the risk of persecution on 
one of the grounds foreseen in the Refugee Convention (European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014: 66). Namely, 
the formulation of Article 3 does not allow for any exceptions, not even for 
reasons of public interest nor for national security. Moreover, no derogations 
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are allowed as regards Article 3 in times of war or due to public emergency 
(Maas, 2009: 28). 
 Article 3 prohibits torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in absolute terms, irrespective of the victims conduct. Under 
Article 3, the responsibility of the state will be engaged “when any expulsion 
is made where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the 
person concerned faced a real risk of being subjected to torture or to human 
or degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which he or she was 
returned” (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of 
Europe, 2014: 66; Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, ¶135). 
 The absolute nature of Article 3 has been confirmed by the ECtHR 
many times. In this sense, in the case of Saadi v. Italy, the ECtHR noted that 
“states face immense difficulties in modern times in protecting their 
communities from terrorist violence”. Nevertheless, the ECtHR concluded 
that “must not, however, call into question the absolute nature of Article 3” 
(Saadi v. Italy, ¶137). Futher, the ECtHR reaffirmed that “ … it is not 
possible to weigh the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons put forward for 
the expulsion in order to determine whether the responsibility of a State is 
engaged under Article 3 … In that connection, the conduct of the person 
concerned, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into account, 
with the consequence that the protection afforded by Article 3 is broader than 
that provided for in Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 United Nations 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees” (Saadi v. Italy, ¶138). 
 Having in mind the foregoing, It could be noted that although the 
regime established under the CEAS fills some of the gaps regarding those 
individuals who need international protection, but do not fall within the 
scope of the Refugee Convention, it “still fails to apply to all those who are 
recognized by the European Court of Human Rights as being in need of - and 
entitled to - international protection” (Mole and Meredith, 2010: 11). 
 
Conclusion 
 The definition of a refugee under the Refugee Convention does not 
cover all individuals who seek international protection. This is mainly due to 
the lack of possibility to establish a link between the persecution feared and 
one of the five grounds that the Refugee Convention foresees (race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion). 
However, the EU Member States have managed to fill this gap by 
introducing complementary protection, based on the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR. Namely, the ECtHR has interpreted Article 3 of the ECHR in the 
sense to impose prohibition to remove an individual if substantial grounds 
have been shown that he or she will suffer treatment contrary to Article 3, 
such as torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.   
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 It could be concluded that this implicit obligation of non-refoulement, 
emanating from Article 3, represents a barrier to removal that provides 
significant complementary protection to refugees from expulsion. The 
significant complementary role that the principle of non-refoulement under 
the ECHR plays regarding the protection of asylum seekers is even more 
strengthened by the absolute character of non-refoulement under Article 3. 
Namely, the principle of non-refoulement under Article 3 of the ECHR has 
an absolute character, unlike the prohibition of refoulement later codified 
under EU law, which is not absolute and provides grounds for exceptions to 
the prohibition. 
 The complementary protection provided by the prohibition of 
refoulement under the ECHR is not formally codified, while this is not the 
case in terms of EU law anymore. Namely, the Qualification Directive 
2004/83/EC (later revised with the Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU), 
which refers to complementary protection as subsidiary protection, has in 
large part codified the jurisprudence on complementary protection under 
Article 3. It defines the criteria of eligibility for subsidiary protection and 
codifies the prohibition of non-refoulement.  
 Having in consideration the previous, it could be concluded that the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR has important relevance to the EU asylum law 
and policy. However, based on the comparison of EU law and ECHR 
protection standards for asylum seekers, it could also be concluded that there 
are differences between EU law protection standards for asylum seekers and 
those of the ECHR. This is particularly the case in terms of non-refoulement 
obligations under Article 3 of the ECHR and subsidiary protection foreseen 
in the Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU, as supranational EU Law.  
 Yet, one should have in mind that the two regimes are independent 
and that the ECHR binds the EU Member States, not the EU itself. However, 
EU Member States are bound under both regimes. As a consequence, EU 
Member States are faced with dual systems providing protection to those 
who seek asylum. This could lead to different rulings as regards similar 
issues of protection, and a number of complexities and uncertainties. A 
possible step forward towards getting out of this situation, and avoiding the 
various problems that inevitably arise when dual systems exist at the same 
time, could be acceleration and completion of the process of EU accession to 
the ECHR, provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon and Protocol 14 to the 
ECHR. 
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